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Abstract
The ‘faculty psychology’ approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in
terms of categories that reflect modular ‘faculties’, such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions,
has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain
organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology
approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human
brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic
psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not
limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology
approach, this ‘constructionist’ approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide
the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience.
“A science of the relations of mind and brain must show how the elementary
ingredients of the former correspond to the elementary functions of the latter,” [1]
(p. 28).
Faculties v. Constructions: The Search for the Physical Basis of the Mind
In the mid-19th century, philosophers, neurologists, and physiologists began the search for
the physical basis of the human mind. Many subscribed to the view that the mind was
divided into distinct mental categories reflecting modular “faculties,” such as emotions (e.g.,
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, etc.), cognitions (e.g., memory, attention, decisions,
etc.), and perceptions (e.g., visual images, auditory sounds, etc.). Each faculty, reflected in
commonsense experiences (now called “folk psychology”), was assumed to have its own
biological core responsible for its creation, such as a location in the brain or a pattern in the
physiology of the body. At the dawn of psychological science, William James [1] and
Wilhelm Wundt [2] warned that commonsense faculties should be abandoned as a scientific
framework for the mind and instead argued for a “constructionist” model in which mental
events are caused by a set of more basic, common operations or elements (e.g., hedonic
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feeling was thought to be a common element in emotions, but also in cognitions and
perceptions) (see Box 1). Nonetheless, faculty psychology has remained the dominant
approach for understanding the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we use the
science of emotion and emerging trends in cognitive neuroscience to reveal how functional
neuroimaging studies illuminate the pitfalls of a faculty psychology approach to
understanding the human mind. We then outline how a modern constructionist model of the
mind, in which mental states are created from more basic, domain-general processes, can
better explain evidence from the neuroscience literature. We close by discussing how a
constructionist model provides a new functional architecture of mind: brain correspondence
to guide hypothesis testing in cognitive neuroscience.
No Brain-Based Evidence for Emotion Faculties
The science of emotion provides one of the clearest examples of faculty psychology over the
past century. Even today, popular models assume that there are a set of emotion faculties
that are biologically “basic,” meaning that each type of emotion is supposed to have its own
biological core [e.g., 3]. One compelling variant of this “basic emotion” hypothesis is that
each emotion faculty has its own dedicated neural circuitry that is architecturally distinct,
inborn, and shared with other animals [4]. Although early neuroimaging studies were
interpreted as evidence for emotion faculties (e.g., amygdala and fear [5], insula and disgust
[6], subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) and sadness [7], the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) and anger [7]), recent meta-analyses [8, 9] fail to demonstrate a consistent and
specific relationship between activation in any one region of brain tissue and any one
emotional faculty (e.g., the amygdala shows increased activity across experiences and
perceptions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness [9]). Although the lack of
specificity in meta-analytic findings may merely reflect the limitations of neuroimaging
methods, these findings are convergent with behavior and peripheral nervous system activity
in emotion, as well as single-cell recordings, electrical stimulation studies, and lesion
studies: to date, no consistent and specific one-to-one correspondence have been observed
between physical measurements and anger, sadness, fear, disgust, etc. (Box 2). Together,
these findings point to a qualitatively different model of the mind.
Emotions as Constructed Mental States
Although a constructionist framework has been largely absent from cognitive neuroscience
to date (but for recent examples [10, 11]), it has made regular appearances in the
psychological literature on emotion throughout the last century [12]. One key hypothesis
that unites constructionist approaches to emotion is that instances of emotion emerge from
basic, interacting psychological processes (operations, building blocks, or “ingredients”);
each operation performs a domain-general psychological function that contributes not only
to a variety of emotions, but also to the variety of cognitions and perceptions that people
experience and the actions that they perform. Our own approach [9, 13, 14] (see Box 1) goes
beyond the psychological level to make specific hypotheses about how a network-level
description of brain organization can be used to investigate the mind’s fundamental
psychological building blocks [13]. These basic operations are akin to “mental state
variables” [15] that characterize the brain states corresponding to mental events. Brain
imaging studies make a unique contribution to discovering the basic operations of the mind
because they non-invasively identify how networks within a living brain contribute to
instances of fear, sadness, anger, or any mental state.
Based on behavioral and psychophysiological data, we proposed that emotional experiences
and perceptions are constructed from a set of more basic psychological operations. These
include (1) the feelings that derive from sensations within the body (or the represen tations
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of those interoceptive sensations), called core affect, which are associated with limbic and
paralimbic brain regions [16] within a “salience network” (see Table 1); and, (2) sensations
from the world (exteroceptive sensations) [13] that are associated with modal and
heteromodal sensory cortices (see Table 1). We hypothesize that these sensations are
continuously made meaningful as “situated conceptualizations” using associations from past
experience, organized as emotion category knowledge [13] that we believe is associated
with the midline cortical, lateral prefrontal and temporal regions within the “default
network” [13, 14], as well as language-relevant brain regions (see Table 1). Furthermore, we
hypothesized that executive control supported by a frontoparietal network is important for
orchestrating and regulating this construction process (see Table 1). Our proposal is that
making meaning of sensations is not specific to emotion – these are the processes that create
all mental states. Two growing sources of neuroimaging evidence provide support for this
constructionist approach.
Meta-analyses suggest basic psychological operations in emotion
A first source of neuroimaging evidence for our constructionist hypotheses comes from
recent meta-analyses of task-related neuroimaging studies on emotion [8, 9, 17]. A close
inspection of these meta-analyses not only reveals support for the specific predictions of our
constructionist model, but also provides support for a constructionist approach more
broadly, in that many of the brain regions consistently activated during emotional
experiences and perceptions (see Figure 1) show consistent activation in meta-analyses of
other mental phenomena (e.g., memory, theory of mind, inavigation, prospection [18],
semantics [19], moral decision making, empathy, [20] and pain [21]). These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that brain regions are implementing basic psychological
operations that are not specific to any emotion per se, or even to the category “emotion.” For
example, regions of the default network (see Table 1), which formed two functional clusters
in our emotion meta-analysis [17], also show a consistent increase in activation in meta-
analyses of empathy [20] semantic processing [19], moral judgments [20], mentalizing about
other people [18, 20], autobiographical memory [18], and imagining the future [18]. Limbic
and paralimbic regions within “limbic” and “salience” networks (involved in visceromotor
control and affective representation; see Table 1), formed two functional clusters in our
meta-analysis [17] and also show consistent increases in activation within meta-analyses of
pain [22], aversion [23], and across studies of attention, and language [24]. Aspects of a
frontoparietal network formed a functional cluster in our meta-analysis of emotion [17] and
shows consistent increases in meta-analyses of response inhibition, working memory and
cognitive control [25] but also morality, empathy, theory of mind [20] and semantics [19]
(see Table 1). Finally, a functional cluster of visual regions (e.g., lateral occipital cortex, MT
+, V4) was observed in our meta-analysis [17], indicating that exteroceptive perception is an
important operation in emotion.
Intrinsic networks suggest basic psychological operations in emotion
Recent evidence from task-independent studies of intrinsic connectivity are a second source
of evidence in support of constructionist framework. Intrinsic functional networks spanning
subcortical regions and frontal, cingulate, parietal, temporal, and occipital cortices [26, 27]
are observed when researchers correlate low-frequency blood-oxygenation level dependent
(BOLD) signal fluctuations in voxels when the brain is not being probed by an external
stimulus (i.e., during task-independent periods). Such intrinsic (i.e., non-stimulus driven)
activity accounts for a large proportion of the brain’s metabolic budget [28], corresponds to
anatomical connectivity between brain regions [29, 30], and is similar to the activity
observed during psychological tasks [26,31], leading to the hypothesis that the structure of
this activity reveals something about the basic functional architecture of the brain.
Furthermore, individual differences in intrinsic connectivity predict activity during
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psychological tasks [32] and differences in behavior [31, 33, 34]. Perhaps most importantly,
the intrinsic networks identified in the literature resemble the task-related activations
observed in our emotion meta-analyses [9, 17], as well as task-related activations that occur
in other psychological domains (e.g., memory [18], semantics [19], theory of mind [18, 20],
pain [21], working memory [25]). See Table 1 for a list of networks derived in multiple
intrinsic connectivity studies using multiple methods and their hypothesized functional
description according to our constructionist framework. We focus on the seven intrinsic
networks identified by Yeo et al. [27], since these networks are consistent with findings
from other studies (see Table 1) and were derived from one of the largest sample sizes to
date (N=1000).
Although methodology can impact the exact spatial topography and number of networks
observed in a given study, there is still surprising consistency in the networks observed
across individuals, within an individual across instances, and across methods [35]. Even
studies that differ in the number of networks identified are still often consistent with one
another, insofar that they merely represent more refined or expanded versions of the same
canonical networks. For instance, analyses that observe more networks [e.g., a 7 v. 17
network solution, 27] or that use methods to optimize the temporal (as opposed to spatial)
independence of networks [36] find that the canonical “default network” breaks down into
two sub-networks: a cortical midline network implicated in autobiographical memory and
simulation plus a lateral frontal and temporal network implicated in language [27, 36]. This
finding is still ultimately consistent with our constructionist hypothesis that the default
network supports conceptualization, where conceptual knowledge is supported (at least in
part) by language.
A Constructionist Functional Architecture of the Human Brain
Although there are many different levels of brain organization that can be meaningfully
interpreted, we propose that psychological descriptions map best to the network level—the
broadly distributed brain networks that are consistently evident in meta-analyses of task-
related data and that consistently appear as intrinsic networks in task-independent data. We
have proposed one specific set of constructionist hypotheses from our work on emotion, but
a variety of hypotheses are possible (and hopefully, in the future, likely). As an alternative
functional architecture of the human brain, a constructionist framework proposes that
instances of mental categories from faculty psychology (which currently defines Western
philosophy of mind) do not reflect the causal structure of the mind. Instead, instances of
emotion, cognition, perception, and action are products of the mind that are realized from a
set of more basic psychological operations that can plausibly describe the functions of
broadly distributed networks in the human brain. It is tempting to assume that these
networks are rigid, “Lego-like” building blocks, but we instead work with the idea that
networks are flexible assemblies of neurons that statistically fire together in a probabilistic
way. At present, data does not exist to allow a more specific mechanistic understanding of
how proposed basic psychological operations emerge from the interplay of these neurons
(e.g., at the level of interaction between neurons within different layers of cortex), although
we hope this is a direction of future research. Understanding how psychological function
emerges from assemblies of neurons is not a problem specific to constructionism, but exists
for any neural model that hypothesizes emergentism.
Our constructionist proposal is synergistic with other contemporary themes in the cognitive
neuroscience literature, particularly discussions on the limitations of faculty psychology and
modular views of brain organization [37-40], network-based models of cognition [41, 42],
and systems neuroscience more generally. Our proposal builds on these themes by
suggesting that brain networks perform basic psychological operations that contribute to the
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construction of a number of different categories of mental phenomena that people
experience differently (just as flour, water, and salt contribute to a variety of different
recipes whose products look, taste, and feel differently). Finally, like others, we recognize
the promise of understanding the functions of intrinsic connectivity networks [30, 35]. Yet
we do not hypothesize that intrinsic networks correspond to faculties (i.e., particular
emotions, cognitions or aspects of perception) [31], particular behaviors [30], or certain
classes of stimuli [43].
The need for a unifying framework to understand how psychological functions map to
physical measurements is not new—every scientist who uses psychological terms to
describe physical measurements is using a psychological theory, whether explicitly or not
[44, 45]. Of late, there have been calls in cognitive neuroscience for a new mental ontology
to guide the study and interpretation of brain function in psychological terms [25, 46, 47].
Construction provides one fruitful alternative. The value of a constructionist ontology can
already be observed in research on memory, where there is an emerging recognition that
interacting operations contribute to the construction of memories, and that some of these
operations are important to other kinds of mental states (e.g., “cognitive” states such as
fictitious imaginings, navigation, prospection, theory of mind, etc.)[11]. Yet, there is now
evidence that these operations are also consistently engaged in emotion [9] and in perception
[48]. A constructionist functional architecture explicitly builds on such observations and
uses them to understand brain function. It thus encourages a qualitative shift in theorizing,
from hypothesizing “where” different types of mental states “live” in the brain to asking
“how” [49] networks of brain regions contribute to the construction of an instance of fear,
sadness, anger, autobiographical memory, concentration, self-esteem, etc., as the variety of
mental states that populate human mental life.
As an approach to cognitive neuroscience, a constructionist framework motivates important
shifts in how research findings are interpreted, potentially helping to resolve the current
limitations in reverse inference [50]. Researchers would no longer be free to interpret the
functions of a brain region or network in terms of their own goals and interests, and would
be compelled to consider other domains of research (including anatomy) during the
inference process. For example, the anterior insula has been interpreted as a brain region
dedicated to emotion, pain, attention, and memory. From a faculty psychology standpoint,
the anterior insula might be interpreted as a multifunctional area, with the specificity of
findings limited by current neuroimaging methods (which could presumably not detect the
smaller anatomical circuits for each faculty within this broader brain region). From a
constructionist approach, however, using intrinsic connectivity and anatomical findings as a
guide [34, 51], the anterior insula is interpreted as a region that is necessary for two basic
operations: (1) representing interoceptive sensations to regulate attention (in its dorsal
extent); and, (2) creating affective feeling (in its ventral extent) which, according to Wundt
[2], is a core feature of all mental states. In a construction framework, the goal is to describe
the psychological “lowest common denominators” or psychological primitives [13] that will
link a range of findings across mental states that appear to be very different on the surface.
The anterior insula might thus be a “hot spot” in the human brain that shows increased
activity during a range of perceptual, cognitive, and emotional events [24] because
interoceptive information from the body is an important ingredient in all these mental states.
Using these psychological primitives, a constructionist approach might be profitably
incorporated into the Cognitive Atlas project, which is a tool for mapping brain activity to
psychological constructs [25, 52].
A constructionist approach would not only influence the interpretation of findings, but it
also has value for shaping how neuroimaging experiments are conducted in the first place.
Rather than starting with a commonsense category and looking for its neural correlates,
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experiments would manipulate specific psychological operations in an a priori way, and then
examine their consequences for the content and type of resulting mental states [for a recent
example of this approach, see 53].
Of course, the search for psychological primitives is just beginning. One thing to consider
moving forward is whether the basic elements we have hypothesized in this paper and
elsewhere [9, 13] do in fact represent the most “psychologically primitive” level of
description (i.e., or whether they, themselves, can be reduced to something more
psychologically basic). For example, the limbic circuitry that is important for creating core
affect can be parsed further into networks supporting affiliation or avoidance [54] and these
networks themselves contain more circumscribed circuits that are linked to specific actions
(e.g., freezing, fleeing, and fighting) [55]. Yet such actions are not synonymous with the
complex human psychological categories (e.g., fear and anger) that we are trying to
understand [14, 55], and which might be better approached using a construction framework.
Neuroimaging methods do not have the spatial or temporal resolution to permit strong
conclusions about the specificity of all neural mechanisms, although we suggest that these
methods are valuable for mapping the distributed, large-scale brain networks whose
functions are best described in psychological terms.
A successful science of the mind depends not only on having sophisticated measurements of
the brain, but also on a theoretical framework to link those data to psychological constructs
in a meaningful and generative way. A constructionist approach requires that cognitive
neuroscientists abandon the naïve realist assumption that the structure of experience
(emotions, cognitions, and perceptions) reveals causal mechanisms within the brain.
Constructionism distinguishes psychological operations from the mental events that they
produce and provides the field with an alternative for mapping mind to brain.
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Glossary
Faculty psychology A scientific framework in which it is hypothesized that
commonsense mental states such as cognitions (e.g., memory,
attention, decisions, etc.), emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, etc.), and perceptions (e.g., visual images,
auditory sounds, etc.), are the basic faculties or abilities of the
mind. A faculty psychology approach assumes that these
categories can be mapped to the physical structure of the body and
brain.
Natural kind A phenomenon that exists in nature independently of human
perception. In the philosophical literature, a phenomenon can be
defined as a natural kind by homology (in that all instances of that
phenomenon derive from the same causal mechanism) or analogy
(in that all instances of that phenomenon share similar surface
features; i.e., look the same, function the same).
Constructionism A scientific framework in which it is hypothesized that
commonsense mental states such as cognitions (e.g., memory,
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attention, decisions, etc.), emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, etc.), and perceptions (e.g., visual images,
auditory sounds, etc.) are mental states that are created (or
“constructed”) out of the combination of more basic psychological
operations or “ingredients.” A constructionist approach assumes




The process of making sensations meaningful in a context using
past experience.
Core affect The representation of sensations from inside the body that can be
experienced as a bodily symptom or as feelings of pleasure-
displeasure with some degree of arousal.
Exteroceptive
sensation
The representation of sensations from outside the body (e.g.,
visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory sensations).
Conceptualization Representations of prior experiences (i.e., memories, knowledge)
that are used to make meaning of sensations in the present.
Executive control A source of attention that helps prioritize sensations and
conceptualizations for conscious awareness by selecting some
information and inhibiting other information.
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Faculty Psychology and Constructionism: Competing approaches to the
mind
In “faculty psychology,” the mind is thought to consist of functionally encapsulated
mental faculties or “mental organs” (akin to the organs of the body [56]), each with a
specific and distinct physical cause [57]. In modern neuroscience, this view manifests as
the hypothesis that a specific faculty corresponds consistently and specifically to
increased activity in a given brain area, network of areas, or even in specific neurons.
Both James [1] and Wundt [2] were highly critical of faculty psychology as a scientific
framework, arguing that faculties encoded in language and reflecting commonsense
experiences (e.g., “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” “thoughts,” “memory”) were unlikely to
represent the organization of the mind and could not support scientific induction. They
instead hypothesized that mental states were constructed of more basic, domain-general
“ingredients” of the mind that contributed to all mental states (including emotions,
cognitions and perceptions). Despite the predominance of faculty psychology in modern
psychology and neuroscience, important traces of this constructionist framework
survived, especially in the science of emotion [12]. Our modern constructionist model [9,
13, 14] was originally developed from experiential, behavioral, and peripheral
physiological data. Rather than assuming that anger, disgust, fear, etc. are natural kind
categories that are inborn and given by the structure of the brain and body, we propose
that emotional experiences and perceptions are constructed from a set of more basic
operations: sensations and feelings from the body (called core affect) and sensations from
the world (exteroceptive sensations) that are made meaningful using past experience
(conceptual knowledge), including knowledge about the emotion categories encoded in
language [9, 13]. The process of using knowledge to make meaning of sensations in
context is called a “situated conceptualization” [58]. We hypothesize that executive
control is important as an additional operation involved in regulating the process of
situated conceptualization, insofar that it inhibits or prioritizes the representation of
certain conceptual or sensory information in a given instance to create a unified
conscious field. Constructionist views are also consistent with systems neuroscience
approaches that conceive of mental states as emerging from the combination of brain
networks (see Figure below).
Lindquist and Barrett Page 11













Box 1 Figure. Faculty psychology v. constructionist predictions for mapping mind to brain
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Evidence for Emotion Faculties in the Body?
In the century preceding the development of neuroimaging methods, psychologists
sought consistent and specific physical evidence for anger, disgust, fear, and other
emotion faculties in physical measurements of the body such as human facial muscle
movements (i.e., the hypothesis that certain emotions have consistent and specific facial
expressions [59]), vocal acoustics (i.e., the hypothesis that certain emotions have
consistent and specific physical properties of the voice [60]), or in coordinated patterns of
autonomic response (i.e., the hypothesis that certain emotions have autonomic
“signatures” [61]). Yet, starting in the early 1900’s, review papers began observing that
experimental evidence routinely fails to show that emotions can be distinguished by
consistent and specific patterns in physical measurements of the human body [12]. In
addition, we have recently pointed out that the lesion [9], single-cell recording [9] and
human electrical brain stimulation [62] evidence in non-human and human animals is not
consistent with emotional faculties either. While the careful use of lesions, optigenetics,
etc., has identified circuits for individual actions (such as freezing, fleeing, and fighting),
these actions are not synonymous with human emotion and don’t constitute evidence for
its biological basis [14, 55]. While some researchers continue to believe that better
methods and more precise measures will reveal the physical basis of anger, sadness, fear,
etc. many psychologists have come to the conclusion that physical measurements of the
face, voice, and body index general affective dimensions (e.g., whether a person is in a
pleasant or unpleasant state [63] or is aroused or quiescent), but not whether a person is
angry, sad or afraid. Individual studies that support the idea of emotion faculties exist in a
sea of experiments that do not replicate these findings, so that collectively, the empirical
evidence shows that the mental states people call anger (or sadness, fear, or other
emotions) in humans are too variable to hold natural kind status [13, 63]. These findings
have exposed an explanatory gap in the science of emotion, because it is still necessary to
explain how anger, or sadness, or fear emerges from the more general affective
dimensions indexed by face, voice, and body measurements, and ultimately, from the
brain. A constructionist approach is useful in this regard because it describes how these
experiences emerge without assuming that the experiences themselves reflect faculties
that correspond to the organizational structure of the brain or body.
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Figure 1. Meta-analytic findings of emotion
Brain areas with a consistent increase in activity across studies of emotion are shown in
yellow, orange, pink and magenta (corresponding to height and three extent-based
thresholds, respectively). Data are from the largest meta-analysis of studies of emotion
experience and perception to date (91 studies published between January, 1990- December,
2007) and demonstrate that emotions are implemented by a range of brain regions including
those associated with the default network (medial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal cortex,
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex), salience network (insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex,
amygdala) and frontoparietal network (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex). © Cambridge
University Press 2012. Reprinted with permission from [9].
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Table 1
Intrinsic Networks and their functional description in our constructionist framework
Network
name(s)
Brain regions included Tasks observed in Psychological operation in a
constructionist ontology





• emotion and affective experiences
and perceptions [9, 17]
• • autobiographical memory [18]
• • pain [22]
• • motivated behavior [64]
core affect generation: representing
visceromotor states from prior
experience or engaging visceromotor
control of the body to create the core
affective tone (pleasure or
displeasure with some degree of
arousal) that is a basic feature of all
















dorsal anterior insula and
frontal operculum
• emotion and affective experiences




responses. Likely, this network can be
decomposed further into aspects that
represent bodily states (a ventral
anterior insula network) and use
bodily states to drive attention and














1 emotion and affective experiences
and perceptions [9, 17]
2 representations of the self [68]
3 autobiographical memory [18]
4 prospection [18]
5 theory of mind [18]
6 moral reasoning [20]
7 context-sensitive visual perception
[69]
8 spontaneous thought [70]
9 semantics, phonology, sentence
processing [19]
10 emotion regulation (in which a
current emotional state is
reconceptualized as a different
emotional state) [71]
11 placebo response to a painful




prior experiences (i.e., memory or
category knowledge). During
autobiographical memory or
representation of concept knowledge,
this process simulates prior sensorymotor
experiences. During perception
of objects, this process helps make
meaning of sensations from the world
in a context-specific manner. During
emotion, this process helps make
meaning of sensations from the body














• alerting to a stimulus after a cue [74]
• working memory [75]
activity in other networks to create a
unified conscious field during the
construction of a mental state (e.g.,
selecting some conceptual content
when meaning is made of sensations
and inhibiting other content; selecting
some sensations for conscious







• top-down control of visuospatial
attention [76]
visuospatial attention: modulating
activity in exteroceptive sensory
regions (e.g., selecting which visual
sensation are selected for conscious
awareness and inhibiting others).
This process may be specific to visual
sensations given the import of these













Lindquist and Barrett Page 16
Network
name(s)
Brain regions included Tasks observed in Psychological operation in a
constructionist ontology










• somatovisceral sensation [78]
exteroceptive sensory perception:
representing auditory and tactile
sensations
“visual” [27] occipital lobe • vision [79] exteroceptive sensory perception:
representing visual sensations
Note: By examining how brain networks perform during emotions as well as mental states that are typically considered to be other psychological
faculties (e.g., memory, perception, theory of mind, etc.), it is possible to use a more robust form of reverse inference to hypothesize the “lowest
common denominator” that is the best psychological description for each network. The result is a hypothesis about the functional architecture of
the brain that is rooted in basic psychological processes (rather than the set of commonsense faculties now in use; On the need for a new functional
architecture in cognitive neuroscience, see [46, 49, 52]). *Although Yeo et al. did not include subcortical structures in their analysis, we include
subcortical structures in this network based on their known anatomical connections. We include the nuclei of the basal ganglia, which are involved
in orchestrating effortful behavior and motor control [80]. We also hypothesize that the central nucleus of the amygdala, which is involved in
producing autonomic responses [80], and the midbrain periacqueductal gray, which is involved in coordinating coherent physiological and
behavioral responses [80] are part of this network. The basal ganglia, the amygdala and the periacqueductal gray all project to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the major cortical site in Yeo et al.’s limbic network.
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